New York politicians are hoping to pass a bill that would make it a felony to “harass, annoy or threaten” a cop in the line of duty, which would no doubt be used against citizens who record cops in public.

If passed, citizens convicted of the law could find themselves sentenced to four years in prison.

As many of us have learned, it doesn’t take much to annoy a cop. Taking photos of cops can get you beat up, handcuffed and arrested. And verbally protesting that arrest can get you charged with resisting arrest.

But up until now, police in New York would usually have to depend on obstructing governmental administration to arrest photographers, a misdemeanor charge that never sticks in court because it requires a defendant to have physically interfered with police while in the line of duty.

But now they want to throw people in prison for merely annoying cops?

The bill, which is described as having “far reaching consequences” by a New York news site, states the following:

JUSTIFICATION:  Police officers all across this state put their  lives on  the  line  every  day  to protect the people of New York. New York State must establish laws and toughen existing laws that  protect  the police   from   becoming  victims  of  criminals.  Far  too  many  law enforcement officers are being harassed, injured,  even  killed  while honoring  their  commitment  to  protect  and  serve  this  state. The Legislature has a responsibility to do everything we  can  to  protect our  brave  heroes,  our police officers, from violent criminals. This legislation contributes to that premise.

S 240.33 AGGRAVATED HARASSMENT OF A POLICE OFFICER OR PEACE OFFICER.

A  PERSON  IS  GUILTY  OF AGGRAVATED HARASSMENT OF A POLICE OFFICER OR PEACE OFFICER WHEN, WITH THE INTENT TO HARASS, ANNOY, THREATEN OR  ALARM A  PERSON  WHOM HE OR SHE KNOWS OR REASONABLY SHOULD KNOW TO BE A POLICE OFFICER OR PEACE OFFICER ENGAGED IN THE COURSE  OF PERFORMING HIS OR HER OFFICIAL DUTIES, HE OR SHE STRIKES, SHOVES, KICKS OR OTHERWISE  SUBJECTS SUCH PERSON TO PHYSICAL CONTACT.

In reading the fine print, we can see that in order to be convicted of this charge, one would have to strike, shove or kick or otherwise do something physical to the cop, which is not much different than the “assault on a peace officer” statute.

However, the assault on a peace officer charge (or its equivalent statute in respective states) is already abused by cops throughout the country when citizens’ faces inadvertently come in contact with cops’ fists during moments of uncontrollable police rage.

So you can imagine this law would be blatantly abused when New York cops find themselves annoyed by citizens for maybe asking too many questions, taking too many photos or simply demanding some type of accountability.

Just last week, a Washington woman who is deaf and did not hear a cop’s commands was charged with felony assault on a police officer after he punched her repeatedly for failing to heed his orders.

disabled5n-1-web

The bill, sponsored by four republican state senators, was already approved by the State Senate and is on its way to the State Assembly, where if passed, would then go to Governor Andrew Cuomo who would have ten days to sign or veto the bill.

If signed, it will go into effect come November.

And once that happens, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who has bragged about having the “seventh biggest army in the world,” would waste no time in encouraging the NYPD to use that law to crack down on anybody who questions their authority.

More

What they skirt around is the inalienable right of all citizens to resist an unlawful detainment or arrest by any public official. They’re slowly but surely burring this constitutional right under all the pro-police state legislation. Politicians do this for the help of the police unions and law enforcement agencies around the country (scratch mine, i’ll scratch yours). In other words, this politician doesn’t mind the increasing police state, and is willing to help it, as long it gets him a little more into the limelight.

I could say a lot here, both opposing and sympathizing with such a tactic. But I still think forcing these people to have these signs in their yard is used more like a form of punishment than it is a community service. It’s one thing to make your best effort to notify the residents around town, but don’t make the guy wear a sign of humiliation.
But, in my opinion, I think this is just a tactical move by the local government to get sexual predators to move out of their town. You’ll have to excuse me if I reserve my sympathy for someone else.
source: http://www.vice.com/read/sex-offenders-in-florida-now-have-warning-signs-outside-their-homes

I could say a lot here, both opposing and sympathizing with such a tactic. But I still think forcing these people to have these signs in their yard is used more like a form of punishment than it is a community service. It’s one thing to make your best effort to notify the residents around town, but don’t make the guy wear a sign of humiliation.

But, in my opinion, I think this is just a tactical move by the local government to get sexual predators to move out of their town. You’ll have to excuse me if I reserve my sympathy for someone else.

source: http://www.vice.com/read/sex-offenders-in-florida-now-have-warning-signs-outside-their-homes

EFF to Texas High Court: A Cell Phone Isn’t a Pair of Pants
“Is a cell phone really a pair of trousers?”
That’s the question posed in a Texas case dealing with whether the police need a warrant to search the contents of a cell phone sitting in a jail’s property room. In a new amicus brief we filed in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, we explain police need a warrant before searching an arrested person’s cell phone.
Teenager Anthony Granville was arrested at his high school for a misdemeanor and booked into the county jail. All of his belongings, including his cell phone, were taken from him and placed in the jail’s property room while he was locked up. Three hours after his arrest, a different officer than the one who arrested Granville at the high school went into the property room and, without a search warrant, looked through Granville’s phone in search of evidence connected to another, unrelated misdemeanor felony.
The trial court suppressed the evidence taken from the phone, finding the officer had plenty of time and opportunity to obtain a search warrant and no exigent circumstance justified the search. The state appealed to the Texas Court of Appeals, arguing that Granville had no expectation of privacy in the contents of his cell phone while it was in the jailhouse, noting that looking through the phone was no different than looking at a person’s clothes when they are booked into jail. The appellate court disagreed with the government’s analogy, finding the amount of information stored on mobile devices make a cell phone search far more invasive than a search of clothing. Now the case is in front of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and we’ve filed an amicus brief along with EFF-Austin, the Texas Civil Rights Project and the ACLU of Texas urging the high court to affirm the decision of the two courts before it that found the government’s warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment.
In our amicus brief we explain the government had no excuse for not obtaining a warrant before searching Granville’s phone. A person doesn’t surrender their expectation of privacy in the contents of their phone once the phone is in the hands of jail officials. Plus none of the exceptions to the search warrant requirement applied. This wasn’t a search “incident to arrest” since it took place hours after Granville was arrested, when the phone was out of his control. And it wasn’t an “inventory search” because once the phone itself was inventoried and secured by the police, there was no need to inventory the data on the phone. Plus, a inventory search can’t be used as a pretext for a clearly investigatory search, which this certainly was. 
Trying to pigeonhole the search of a cell phone into legal precedent addressing something quite different only highlights the need to have the law account for technological changes. As Professor Orin Kerr observed recently, “thanks to changing technology and its widespread adoption, searching a person meant one thing in 1973 and means something quite different today.” Courts are slowly recognizing this. In United States v. Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that given the amount of information stored on electronic devices, border agents must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before engaging in a “forensic examination” of an electronic device. Part of the court’s justification was that although the amount of items a person can carry in physical luggage is necessarily limited, the same isn’t true with electronic devices. A broad electronic search policy would be the equivalent of searching luggage for “not only what the bag contained on the current trip, but everything it had ever carried.” 
The appellate court’s obvious conclusion that “a cell phone is not a pair of pants” follows this correct line of thinking and makes clear that our privacy rights don’t become eviscerated simply because invasive searches not contemplated 30 years ago can now happen with just a few taps on a screen.

EFF to Texas High Court: A Cell Phone Isn’t a Pair of Pants

“Is a cell phone really a pair of trousers?”

That’s the question posed in a Texas case dealing with whether the police need a warrant to search the contents of a cell phone sitting in a jail’s property room. In a new amicus brief we filed in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, we explain police need a warrant before searching an arrested person’s cell phone.

Teenager Anthony Granville was arrested at his high school for a misdemeanor and booked into the county jail. All of his belongings, including his cell phone, were taken from him and placed in the jail’s property room while he was locked up. Three hours after his arrest, a different officer than the one who arrested Granville at the high school went into the property room and, without a search warrant, looked through Granville’s phone in search of evidence connected to another, unrelated misdemeanor felony.

The trial court suppressed the evidence taken from the phone, finding the officer had plenty of time and opportunity to obtain a search warrant and no exigent circumstance justified the search. The state appealed to the Texas Court of Appeals, arguing that Granville had no expectation of privacy in the contents of his cell phone while it was in the jailhouse, noting that looking through the phone was no different than looking at a person’s clothes when they are booked into jail. The appellate court disagreed with the government’s analogy, finding the amount of information stored on mobile devices make a cell phone search far more invasive than a search of clothing. Now the case is in front of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and we’ve filed an amicus brief along with EFF-Austin, the Texas Civil Rights Project and the ACLU of Texas urging the high court to affirm the decision of the two courts before it that found the government’s warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment.

In our amicus brief we explain the government had no excuse for not obtaining a warrant before searching Granville’s phone. A person doesn’t surrender their expectation of privacy in the contents of their phone once the phone is in the hands of jail officials. Plus none of the exceptions to the search warrant requirement applied. This wasn’t a search “incident to arrest” since it took place hours after Granville was arrested, when the phone was out of his control. And it wasn’t an “inventory search” because once the phone itself was inventoried and secured by the police, there was no need to inventory the data on the phone. Plus, a inventory search can’t be used as a pretext for a clearly investigatory search, which this certainly was. 

Trying to pigeonhole the search of a cell phone into legal precedent addressing something quite different only highlights the need to have the law account for technological changes. As Professor Orin Kerr observed recently, “thanks to changing technology and its widespread adoption, searching a person meant one thing in 1973 and means something quite different today.” Courts are slowly recognizing this. In United States v. Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that given the amount of information stored on electronic devices, border agents must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before engaging in a “forensic examination” of an electronic device. Part of the court’s justification was that although the amount of items a person can carry in physical luggage is necessarily limited, the same isn’t true with electronic devices. A broad electronic search policy would be the equivalent of searching luggage for “not only what the bag contained on the current trip, but everything it had ever carried.” 

The appellate court’s obvious conclusion that “a cell phone is not a pair of pants” follows this correct line of thinking and makes clear that our privacy rights don’t become eviscerated simply because invasive searches not contemplated 30 years ago can now happen with just a few taps on a screen.

King Co., Washington: Cops Fire 20 Bullets At Unarmed Man In His Bed Then Call It “Justifiable”

(video mirror)

back to top